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BEFORE THE LABOR COMMISSIONER
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

JOSHUA BLOOMBERG pka Joshua Path,)	Case No. TAC 31-94
)	
Petitioner,)	
)	DECISION
v.)	
)	
SUSAN BUTLER, dba)	
KRYSTONE MANAGEMENT,)	
)	
Respondent.)	

This matter came on regularly for hearing on July 18, 1994, in Los Angeles, California. Craig R. Gates appeared on behalf of the Petitioner Joshua Bloomberg; Respondent, Susan Butler appeared in propria persona.

FACTS

The following facts were stipulated to by the parties.

1. Respondent was not a licensed talent agent.
2. Petitioner and Respondent entered into the Personal Management Agreement dated April 30, 1992.
3. Respondent signed the contract dated February 2, 1993, which purports to be a contract for services between Joshua Path and LONE WOLF PRESENTS which covered an engagement at the Roxy.

The Petitioner contended in his testimony that he had booked an estimated fifteen of his own shows over the past three years. In addition, he has made a number of tapes.

1 According to Petitioner, Respondent violated the provisions of
2 Labor Code § 1700.4 by procuring employment for Petitioner to
3 perform at the Roxy, located at 9009 Sunset Blvd., Los Angeles, on
4 March 27, 1993, and Tio Alberto's, located at 1121 Broad St., San
5 Luis Obispo, on either April 1st or 2nd, 1993.

6 According to Petitioner, the Respondent told him that she had
7 procured the employment at the two locations listed above.

8 According to the testimony of Respondent, she acted in the
9 capacity of a personal agent attempting to guide the career of Mr.
10 Bloomberg. The Respondent's unrefuted testimony shows that she
11 spent an estimated 1000 hours over a one year period in guiding
12 Petitioner's career and received a total of less than \$300.00¹.

13 Again, the unrefuted testimony of the Respondent evidences the
14 fact that she contacted at least nine licensed artist managers in
15 an attempt to solicit the services of a talent agent for the
16 Petitioner.

17 In February of 1993 she asked the Petitioner what he would
18 like to do for his upcoming birthday. Petitioner responded that he
19 would enjoy playing the Roxy. Respondent reminded the Petitioner
20 that the Roxy was a pay-to-play venue that was designed to showcase
21 talent. As a general rule, those who played the Roxy were required
22 to sell tickets for the performance. The pay-for-play player was
23 required to pay the difference in the costs of the theater and the
24 costs recovered by the sale of tickets.

25 Respondent, pursuant to Petitioner's birthday wish, contacted

26 ¹Respondent also testified that she waived over \$3000.00 in
27 commissions pursuant to the provisions of the "Personal Management
28 Agreement". This waiver was designed to help the Petitioner in his
young career.

1 the management of the Roxy and discussed the possibility of
2 Petitioner appearing. She was told that Bloomberg (pka Path) was
3 known and that he would be allowed to perform and he would be paid
4 if a certain number of customers paid to attend the performance.
5 The minimum was met and exceeded and Petitioner was paid for the
6 performance. Respondent states that she received her 20% commission
7 on the amount received by Petitioner based upon the terms of the
8 Personal Management Agreement. She testified that the commission
9 on that performance was between \$15.00 and \$20.00.

10 The contract she received from the Roxy management (Lone Wolf
11 Presents) was signed by her after she discussed the contract with
12 Petitioner. The power to sign the contract is contained in the
13 Personal Management Agreement between Petitioner and Respondent.

14 Respondent testified, and was undisputed, that she did not
15 make the changes on the contract or negotiate the terms of the
16 contract. The terms were offered by the Roxy management and it was
17 the Roxy management who made the interlineation on the face of the
18 contract according to the unrefuted testimony of Respondent.

19 In regard to the Tio Alberto performance, Respondent testified
20 that she was contacted by Petitioner regarding a performance which
21 he had arranged with a fraternity. She was told by Petitioner that
22 the fraternity had taken the entire Tio Alberto facility for the
23 show. She cautioned Petitioner that the price offered by the
24 fraternity might not cover his expenses in going to San Luis
25 Obispo. Respondent called the management at Tio Alberto inquiring
26 about the type of public address system available. In her
27 discussion with the management person from Tio Alberto, she was
28 told that, in view of the fact that Petitioner was known, if the

1 fraternity did not come up with enough money to cover the expenses
2 which Petitioner would incur, Tio Alberto would allow him to work
3 the cocktail hour in order to earn enough to cover the expenses.
4 Respondent called Petitioner and explained this turn of events to
5 him and he told her that he would work the cocktail hour.
6 Respondent did not receive any commissions on any fees which
7 Petitioner may have received from Tio Alberto.

8
9 DISCUSSION

10 The Act prohibits the occupation of "procuring, offering,
11 promising, or attempting to procure employment or engagements for
12 an artist" unless the person performing such activities is licensed
13 pursuant to the Talent Agencies Act. "Since the clear object of the
14 Act is to prevent improper persons from becoming [talent agents]
15 and to regulate such activity for the protection of the public, a
16 contract between an unlicensed [talent agent] and an artist is
17 void. Buchwald v. Superior Court (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 347, 351.

18 There was no dispute that Petitioner is an artist as that word
19 is defined in the Talent Agency Act. Both of the performances
20 which Petitioner contends are connected with a violation of the Act
21 are within the one-year statute of limitations set out in the
22 provisions of Labor Code § 1700.44.

23 The testimony and evidence received at this hearing can lead
24 to no other conclusion than that the activities performed by the
25 Respondent in respect to the Tio Alberto performance can not be
26 classified as procurement of employment under any circumstances.
27 Respondent simply called the management after finding out that
28 Petitioner had made arrangements to perform. Her call was related

1 to equipment which might be needed. The unsolicited offer by Tio
2 Alberto's management to allow Petitioner to work the cocktail hour
3 to defray expenses can hardly be construed as solicitation of
4 employment.

5 In connection with the Roxy engagement: The call made by
6 Respondent to a pay-to-play venue is not the solicitation of
7 employment. Such activity is nothing more than an attempt to
8 advance the artist's career. The term "employment", if it is to
9 have any logical meaning within the context used in the Act,
10 implies payment for the service rendered. Procuring employment
11 certainly does not imply soliciting a position which entails paying
12 for the right to perform the service.

13 The fact that while performing an activity that was obviously
14 within the realm of the personal manager, there was an unexpected
15 turn of events which resulted in the Petitioner being paid for the
16 performance was simply fortuitous. It would have been illogical to
17 expect a personal manager under the circumstances to refuse to pass
18 on the information to her client.

19 But even if we had found that the activities engaged in by the
20 Respondent involved the procurement of employment, it would be
21 necessary to show that those procurement activities are signifi-
22 cant. Wachs v. Curry (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 616, 628. The Labor
23 Commissioner has determined that:

24 "[p]rocurement of employment constitutes a 'significant'
25 portion of the activities of an agent if the procurement
26 is not due to inadvertence or mistake and if the activ-
27 ities of procurement have some importance and are not
28 simply a de minimis aspect of the overall relationship
between the parties when compared with the agent's coun-
seling functions on behalf of the artist. This meaning
would seem to be in line with the tenor of the court's
decision in Wachs v. Curry." (Precedent Decision Thomas

